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Abstract
We present a systematic and qualitative review of academic literature on early conceptual development (0–24
months of age), with an emphasis on methodological aspects. The final sample of our review included 281 studies
reported in 115 articles. The main aims of the article were four: first, to organise studies into sets according to
methodological similarities and differences; second, to elaborate on the methodological procedures that
characterise each set; third, to circumscribe the empirical indicators that different sets of studies consider as proof
of the existence of concepts in early childhood; last, to identify methodological limitations and to propose possible
ways to overcome them. We grouped the studies into five sets: preference and habituation experiments, category
extension tasks, object sorting tasks, sequential touching tasks and object examination tasks. In the “Results” section,
we review the core features of each set of studies. In the “Discussion” and “Conclusions” sections, we describe, for
one thing, the most relevant methodological shortcomings. We end by arguing that a situated, semiotic and
pragmatic perspective that emphasises the importance of ecological validity could open up new avenues of
research to better understand the development of concepts in early childhood.
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Concepts are commonly defined as representations of
categories of things in the world, namely representations
of groups of things that have something in common
(Oakes 2008).1 As such, they are thought to enable us to
inhabit the world in which we live by summarising its
complexity, ordering it and adapting it to our limited
cognitive capacities (Alvarez & Franconeri, 2007; Lakoff,
1990). By organising our experience into cognitive clas-
ses, concepts would act as mental stenographers that
allow us, as Bruner, Goodnow and Austin (1956/2009, p.
1) say, to stop being slaves of the particular. Neverthe-
less, their importance does not end there. Concepts en-
able us to make inferences about the potential belonging
of unknown entities to categories already formed (Medin
& Abn, 2004). This two-way process (i.e., world sum-
mary ↔ categorical extension) is very convenient for the
achievement of our practical objectives, as it is the basis
for action planning and cognitive self-regulation (Clifton
et al., 1991; Sakharov, 1990; Strauss, 1979; Zaporozhets,
2002). Without the degree of stability and certainty that
concepts give us, we would not be able to direct our ac-
tion in the world. And, indeed, without concepts that
serve as referents of communication, we could not inter-
act with others as we do (Roberts & Jacobs, 1991;
Wright, 1913), which would condemn us to radical
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1It goes without saying that this definition poses problems due to
ontological and epistemological commitments. There are other
definitions of what a concept is, specific to non-orthodox theoretical
stances and even disciplines (e.g., a concept in psychology is not the
same as in the philosophy of the mind). This not only happens with
the term “concept,” but affects many other key terms, such as “repre-
sentation”, “intentionality”, “intelligence” or “mind”. We have consid-
ered here a generic definition on which there would be consensus
among most psychologists (see Nelson 2011).
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solipsism. Categorisation and conceptualisation are fun-
damental pillars of human cognition. Without them, it
would not be possible to understand perception, mem-
ory, language or any form of general thought. They are
“the glue that holds our mental world together”
(Murphy, 2002, p. 1) and, so, stand as a matter of privi-
leged study in cognitive sciences (Harnad, 2005).
Despite the unparalleled importance of concepts, not
all authors share the idea that their origin can be traced
back to the earliest moments of life (Poulin-Dubois &
Pauen, 2017). After all, even the parents of developmen-
tal psychology placed the first manifestations of concep-
tual development beyond the frontiers of early
childhood. Piaget, for example, assumed that conceptual
intelligence does not develop until the period of concrete
operations; for him, concepts need the classification and
serialisation of reality through a taxonomic system of
categories with fixed and arbitrary linguistic definitions
(Piaget, 1951/1999, p. 220). For Vygotski, meanwhile,
genuine conceptual thinking is a higher psychological
function dependent on language that does not emerge
until adolescence (Vygotsky, 1930/1998, p. 29). In his
words, “real concepts are impossible without words, and
thinking in concepts does not exist beyond verbal think-
ing” (Vygotsky, 1934/2008, p. 115). For Wallon, finally,
concepts only emerge at the end of the long process of
constitution of the cognitive object and presuppose both
the passage from situational intelligence to representa-
tional intelligence and the development, around ten
years of age, of a classification rubric of reality (Wallon
& Ascoli, 1950; Wallon, 1942/1970). Thus, despite con-
sidering that cognitive development involves progressive
constructions, when speaking of concepts these three
authors refer to the mature and sophisticated forms of
conceptual thought to which older children have access
and not to their earliest potential origins.
The demanding threshold that Piaget, Vygotski and
Wallon set for talking about concepts is due, in part, to
their adherence to the Aristotelian perspective on con-
cepts. According to it, concepts are nothing more than
logical definitions consisting of sufficient and necessary
sets of conditions that determine whether the entities of
the world are enclosed in them (Smith & Medin, 1981).
For decades, there have been critical voices arguing that
the classical threshold to which we have referred is a
theoretical obstacle rather than a good description of the
development of cognitive skills (e.g., Fodor, 1972;
Gratch, 1975; Starkey, 1981). As an example, Fodor has
pointed out that Vygotskian theory converts child con-
ceptual development into the gradual approach to the
adult mastery of Boolean logic (Fodor, 1972, p. 90).
In opposition to classical positions in developmental
psychology that relegate the emergence of genuine con-
cepts to later ages, a number of studies have raised the
possibility that categorical organisations and/or concepts
exist from early childhood (e.g., Babska, 1965; Ricciuti,
1965; Ross, 1980; Schlesinger, 1982; Welch, 1939). In
particular, since 1980 we have witnessed an explosion of
studies on the origins of conceptual development in the
0-2 age period. These studies have not only argued that
early conceptualisation is possible, but have also contrib-
uted to our conception of infants as psychological sub-
jects who have at their disposal a rich and complex
conceptual system. A noteworthy innovation is that
these studies consider conceptual thinking to be
expressed not only in linguistic expressions, but also in
certain concept-like behaviours (see Bomba & Siqueland,
1983). By and large, these refer to cases where children
exhibit a similar behaviour with different members of one
category (e.g., several cups) or act differently with mem-
bers of two or more categories. Nonetheless, depending
on their theoretical and methodological framework, stud-
ies consider different behaviours as empirical indicators of
conceptual thinking. Thus, for instance, behaviours such
as looking at a certain stimulus or sequentially touching
objects are considered, by some, as a window into the con-
ceptual architecture of child cognition.
In this article, we present a systematic and qualita-
tive review of academic literature on early concep-
tual development (0–24 months of age), with
emphasis on methodological aspects. The main aims
of the article were four: first, to analyse empirical
studies and organise them into study sets according
to methodological similarities and differences; sec-
ond, to elaborate on the methodological procedures
that characterise each study set; third, to circum-
scribe the empirical indicators that different study
sets consider as proof of the existence of concepts in
early childhood; last, to identify the most critical
methodological limitations of research on early con-
ceptual development and to propose possible ways to
overcome them.
The analysis of the procedures used in each study
allowed us to group them into five sets: preference and
habituation experiments, category extension tasks, object
sorting tasks, sequential touching tasks and object exam-
ination tasks. In the “Results” section, we review the core
features of each set of studies and show consistencies
and inconsistencies between empirical studies to assess
the degree of congruence between them (e.g., if the dif-
ferent studies refer to the same thing when they speak of
categories or concepts). In the “Discussion” and “Con-
clusions” sections, we examine, for one thing, methodo-
logical shortcomings. We further argue that a situated,
semiotic and pragmatic perspective that emphasises the
importance of ecological validity could open up new ave-
nues of research to better understand the development
of concepts in early childhood.
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Method
For the systematic review, we adopted the PRISMA dec-
laration guidelines (Urrútia & Bonfill, 2010). We under-
took a bibliographic query consulting ISI (Web of
Science), Scopus, Proquest, ERIH, PubMed, ScienceDir-
ect, PsycINFO, Psicodoc, Dialnet, SciELO and Latindex
Catalog using the following keywords, in Spanish, Eng-
lish and French: cognitive, development, concepts, cat-
egorisation, early childhood and child. For the Boolean
search, we combined keywords with the following opera-
tors: (cognitive AND development) AND/OR (“early
childhood” OR child) AND (concepts AND/OR categor-
isation). This resulted in a total of between 306 and 52,
104 records, depending on the language of the search,
keyword combinations and the database consulted in
each case. After checking for thematic appropriateness
and removing duplicates, we ended up with a total of 1,
601 records. Subsequently, we proceeded to the screen-
ing (considering titles and abstracts) and filtering (asses-
sing full-text articles), according to the following
eligibility criteria:
 Publication type: We only included empirical articles
published in peer-reviewed scientific journals.
 Publication area: We only included articles
reporting psychological research results.
 Purpose of study: We only included publications on
conceptual and/or categorisation development in
early childhood. Outcomes on related topics (e.g.,
the formation of memories, the development of
perceptual discrimination, the development of object
individuation, the development of associations
between words and objects, and the development of
phonetic discrimination) were excluded.
 Age of the subjects involved in the studies: Since our
focus was early conceptual development, we only
considered, as a rule, studies with participants up to
24 months of age. However, studies involving
subjects older than 24 months were also considered
if and only if they presented relevant and specific
results for the age range considered in this review.
For example, certain studies divide their total sample
into age groups (with at least one of these groups
being within the age range 0–24 months) and report
different degrees of conceptual abilities for each of
them (e.g., presence/absence of conceptual
behaviours) (e.g., Babska, 1965; Bornstein &
Arterberry, 2010; Sugarman, 1981). The chosen
approach has the advantage of not leaving out
potentially valuable empirical evidence.
 Language: We only included publications written in
Spanish, English or French.
 Duplicates: The results of a same empirical
investigation that were reported more than once
(i.e., in two or more different articles) were
excluded.
 Replica experiments. A considerable number of them
presented the results of replica experiments to
which other articles referred. To avoid basing our
methodological comparison on the number of
replicas of certain methods rather than on the
nature of those methods (which would have been a
bias for a methodological review), replica studies
were excluded.
The final sample consisted of 115 articles reporting
281 studies (see Fig. 1).
For each study, we analysed the dimensions listed in
Table 1. The procedural comparison gave rise to five
emerging sets to classify the studies: preference and ha-
bituation experiments, category extension tasks, object
sorting tasks, sequential touching tasks and object exam-
ination tasks. We also included a set of other studies not
congruent with the other emerging sets. Table 2 summa-
rises the frequencies for each set and their breakdown
according to the design type, its temporality, the sample
type and the kind of stimuli used in each case. Since our
review did not consider the year of publication as an eli-
gibility criterion, we provide, in Fig. 2, a timeline show-
ing articles published in the last 20 years (n = 50),
disaggregated according to the set of studies to which
the studies they report (n = 54) belong.
Results
Preference and habituation experiments
Preference and habituation experiments are two pre-
dominant approaches in psychological research. Origin-
ally used to assess the existence of simple sensory
discriminations and preferences (e.g., Valentine, 1914),
these procedures soon extended to the study of attention
to sensory patterns (e.g., Fantz, 1964; Fagan, 1976), the
memoristic retention of incidental visual experiences
(e.g., Fagan, 1970) and object permanence (e.g., Baillargeon
et al., 1985), among other matters.
Generically, researchers use procedures with a high level
of control (i.e., in laboratory settings) to assess whether
there are differences in the fixation of gaze to two stimuli
or groups of stimuli of which only one has been presented
to children in a preliminary phase of familiarisation. The
underlying assumption is that babies’ gazes are not random,
but rather reflect cognitive processes accounting for chil-
dren’s exploratory behaviours and orientation responses
(Berlyne, 1958) or sophisticated statistical inferences (Sim
& Xu, 2019). Since children have a natural propensity to
direct their gaze to stimuli from the first months of life
(Weizmann et al., 1971), this method has been used to
study cognitive development from very early ages (from 8
weeks of age; for a discussion, see Olson, 1976).
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When there are statistically significant attentional
biases, researchers interpret them as indicating cognitive
processes. In the field of early conceptual development,
this general procedure takes on certain particularities.
In the familiarisation phase, subjects are habituated
with stimuli that the researchers consider as exemplars of
the category for which they seek to assess whether chil-
dren have a conceptual representation (e.g., animals, fruits
or geometric shapes). This is done by means of different
tests whose duration is, for the most part, relatively short
(i.e., of the order of a few seconds). Stimuli are quite var-
ied: in our review, we found studies using images, draw-
ings, abstract patterns, objects, artefacts, replicas, non-
objects, videos, language, sounds and music.
Familiarisation trials can be of two types: fixed or in-
fant-controlled (Colombo & Mitchell, 2009). When trials
are fixed, both their duration and the duration of inter-
trial intervals are predetermined. In this case, stimulus
presentations are not linked to infant behaviour: babies
may or may not watch the stimulus without affecting the
development of the procedure. Infant-controlled trials,
on the contrary, begin when children look at the stimuli
and end when children look at something different. Also,
these trials continue until the measure of infant atten-
tion has met a predetermined criterion (e.g., it has de-
creased by a certain percentage).
During the test phase, children are introduced to new
exemplars of the category with which they have previously
become familiar, as well as exemplars of a new category.
The test stimuli may be presented concurrently (i.e., one
familiar stimulus vs. one novel stimulus, all at once) or se-
quentially (i.e., one familiar stimulus followed by one
novel stimulus). The calculation of gaze fixation times for
each kind of test stimulus results, then, in a preference
score, which typically expresses the quotient between the
baby’s gaze fixation time to the exemplars of the novel cat-
egory and the total gaze fixation time (i.e., to exemplars of
both the familiar and novel categories).
When this score is statistically significant, researchers
establish that the baby has extended the generalisation of
habituation to new exemplars of the familiar category (but
not to exemplars of the novel category) and report the ex-
istence of concept-like behaviours (Bomba & Siqueland,
1983). In other words, the differential attention to exem-
plars of the novel category is explained arguing that chil-
dren recognise these exemplars as belonging to a different
Fig. 1 PRISMA flow diagram
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class than the one containing the familiar exemplars—des-
pite the differences that may exist between the latter
(Quinn et al., 2006). Finally, the procedure is usually com-
plemented by using the paradigm of preferential looking
as an experimental control, both to assess whether sub-
jects are capable of distinguishing members of the same
category from each other and to rule out the existence of
a priori inter-categorical preferences (e.g., Eimas & Quinn,
1994, exp. 3 and 5; Quinn & Eimas, 1996, exp. 3, 5 and 6;
Quinn & Johnson, 2000, exp. 3; Younger & Fearing, 1999,
exp. 3).
At the theoretical level, it is assumed that differences
in gaze fixation prove the existence of a children’s cap-
acity to make judgments of relative similarity based on
information encoded during the familiarisation phase
(Sherman, 1985) regarding the perceptual characteristics
of stimuli (i.e., shape, colour, movement) (Quinn et al.,
1993). In this manner, during familiarisation, subjects
would form a mental representation that “allows the fa-
miliarity attached to the previously encountered category
instances to generalise to novel instances of the familiar
category” (Quinn & Eimas, 1996, p. 190).
Through this method, for example, Quinn and Johnson
(2000) habituated 2-month-olds with images of different
cats. In the first test phase, they simultaneously presented
images of a new cat and a rabbit or an elephant. In the
second test phase, they presented images of a new cat and
a dog. The data revealed that there were no statistically
significant differences in preference scores and that, there-
fore, babies did not form a basic-level representation for
cats that excluded exemplars of other animal species. Yet,
when performing the procedure at another level of ab-
straction (global level), the results were different. Another
group of children of the same age was habituated with im-
ages of mammals. After the test phases (new familiar
mammal vs. unknown mammal; unknown mammal vs.
furniture exemplar), the researchers found that at 2
months children can form a global representation of
mammals that includes exemplars of mammals not seen
Table 1 Analytical dimensions for the review
A. Year of publication
B. Research design
1. Descriptive
2. Experimental
C. Sample size
D. Subsample size (studies with two or more experimental conditions)
E. Sample/subsample type. Based on sample/subsample sizes.
1. Case study: one subject
2. Intensive: up to 30 subjects
3. Extensive: more than 30 subjects
F. Temporality
1. Cross-sectional
2. Cross-sequential
3. Longitudinal
G. Age range of subjects (in months)
H. Stimuli
1. Two-dimensional
i. Drawings and images
ii. Abstract patterns
iii. Videos
2. Three-dimensional
i. Objects: material entities that have not been built to fulfil a
particular purpose but can be easily recognised by members of a
community (e.g., a piece of mass, geometric shapes of various
materials)
ii. Artefacts: material entities constructed by a certain technique to
fulfil a culturally determined canonical purpose (e.g., a spoon or a
ballpoint pen).
iii. Object, artefact and living beings replicas: material entities
(usually small) that exactly reproduce the characteristics of an
object/artefact or living being (e.g., a toy horse, a toy spoon).
iv. Non-objects: material entities that resemble an object or artefact
but would not be accepted as such by members of a
community (e.g., stimuli constructed by experimenters
manipulating different dimensions of materiality).
3. Language
4. Sounds and music
I. Data analysis
1. Quantitative
2. Qualitative
3. Mixed
J. Age of development of categorical representations (in months)
Table 2 Number of studies for each set in relation to design type, temporality, sample type and stimuli
Study set Design type Temporality Sample type Stimuli+
D E Cs Cq L CS Int Ext R O A NO D/I P V L S/M
Preference and habituation - 156 141 15 - - 153 3 18 18 6 5 86 15 17 11 12
Category extension 1 48 37 10 2 - 46 3 12 8 18 13 3 - 3 2 -
Object sorting - 5 3 2 - 5 - 2 3 - 3 - - - 2 -
Sequential touching - 27 7 18 2 - 25 2 28 5 4 1 2 1 - - -
Object examining - 34 22 11 1 - 32 2 21 2 - 13 - - - 4 -
Other methods 7 3 3 3 4 2 8 - 1 1 3 - 2 - - - -
Total 8 273 213 59 9 2 269 10 82 37 31 35 93 16 20 19 12
Note. D= descriptive, E= experimental; Cs= cross-sectional, Cq= cross-sequential, L =longitudinal; Cs= case study; Int= intensive, Ext= extensive; R= replicas,
O= objects; A= artefacts; NO= non-objects; D/I= drawings and images; P= patterns; V= videos; L= language; S/M= sounds and music. + As a single study can
feature more than one type of stimuli, the sum of the number of studies for each column does not reflect the total number of studies we analysed
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during familiarisation but excludes furniture. Along the
same lines, Arterberry and Bornstein (2001, 2002) habitu-
ated 3-month-old infants with static images or dynamic
dot patterns from the same set of animals and vehicles.
Subjects presented a significant preference for exemplars
of novel categories in both habituation conditions, demon-
strating that infant categorisation of animals and vehicles
makes use of both static and dynamic information.
These results complement those of other familiarisation
studies with images concluding that, from 3months of age,
children are capable of forming basic-level categories of ani-
mals and furniture (Behl-Chadha, 1996; Eimas & Quinn,
1994; Quinn et al., 1993; Quinn & Eimas, 1996, see also
Roberts, 1988 with 9-month-olds; Younger & Fearing, 1999,
2000 with 10-month-old children), geometrical shapes, and
patterns of sequenced stimuli (Bomba & Siqueland, 1983,
see also Saffran et al., 2007 with 7-month-olds; Colombo
et al., 1990 with 10-month-old infants; Hochmann et al.,
2016 with 14-month-olds). There is also evidence that ac-
companying habituation with images with words or vocali-
sations of non-human primates—but not other sounds—
favours the categorisation of objects in 3-month-old babies
(Ferry et al., 2010, 2013; Perszyk & Waxman, 2017; see also
Balaban & Waxman, 1997 with 9-month-old children).
Moreover, studies show that from the age of 6months chil-
dren exposed to communicative tones show an advantage in
the categorisation of objects (Ferguson & Waxman, 2016)
and that children from 7months have categorical represen-
tations of female faces (Cohen & Strauss, 1979).
Habituation experiments have also involved three-
dimensional stimuli: replicas, objects, artefacts and non-
objects. For example, Needham et al. (2005) habituated
4-month-old infants with boxes of the same size and
shape, but of different background colour, detail colour
and detail shape. In the test phase, babies saw a different
box next to a cylinder. In one experimental condition,
the box and cylinder moved as a unit. In a second ex-
perimental condition, the movement of the box was in-
dependent of that of the cylinder. When they
familiarised children with three boxes of different back-
ground/detail colour and the box used in the test phase
was like the one used during habituation, children fixed
their gaze more during the first experimental condition.
The authors explain this effect by arguing that, under
such conditions, subjects can form a conceptual category
that allows them to differentiate cylinders from boxes.
For his part, Xu (1998, 2002) verified that, at 9 months
of age, if visual familiarisation with two stimuli (a toy
Fig. 2 Timeline: articles published in the last 20 years. Grouped by study set
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duck and a ball; a cup and a shoe for babies; a replica
animal and a non-object constructed for the experiment)
is accompanied by two linguistic labels—one per stimu-
lus, the differential categorisation of the stimuli is facili-
tated. This effect was not maintained when habituating
children using a single linguistic label, two tones, two
sounds or two emotional expressions.
Other studies with three-dimensional stimuli suggest
that from 9months infants have representations of shape-
based object categories (Ruff, 1978; see also Ross, 1980,
with children aged 12–24months) and colour-based ob-
ject categories (Johnson & Woods, 2016), that 12-month-
olds use kind information to individuate objects (Xu et al.,
1999), and that at 14months children can form a context-
ual category of “kitchen items” (e.g., an apple, a high chair,
a bib, a sponge, a carton of milk, a banana, an oven and a
refrigerator) that excludes “toiletries” (e.g., a bathtub, a
toothbrush, a towel, toilet paper, a Vaseline container, a
brush and a packet of disposable tissues) (Mandler et al.,
1987, exp. 1). Finally, some authors propose that, from 4
months, knowledge about object functions facilitates the
categorical representation of artefacts (Stavans & Baillar-
geon, 2018; see Futó et al., 2010; Horst et al., 2005 with
10-month-olds; Booth & Waxman, 2002; Booth et al.,
2010 with 14-month-old children). This evidence supports
the possibility that first concepts are not motivated solely
by perceptual similarities.
Category extension tasks
Early conceptual development has also been researched
through category extension tasks. Those who have used
these tasks often argue that it is not enough to assess the
vicissitudes of children's visual attention, but that other
contextual factors must also be considered. For instance,
Babska (1965) has argued that it is necessary to consider
the conditions under which cognition finds its expression
in a form of activity. This interest in the deployment of ac-
tion in specific contexts has determined that most of these
tasks employ three-dimensional stimuli with which chil-
dren can act (replicas, objects, artefacts and non-objects).
However, these tasks should not be confused with explo-
rations in ecological contexts, as here researchers tend to
manipulate and control variables.
Typically, category extension tasks involve a first phase
of training or behavioural conditioning with a repeated
stimulus or with several exemplars of a class. Once a
homogeneous response has been established or learned,
the researchers proceed to the generalisation phase, in
which children are presented with other stimuli. These
typically include variations of the stimuli presented dur-
ing the training phase. If children extend the learnt be-
havioural pattern to the new stimuli, it is concluded that
they understand that the stimuli presented during both
phases belong to the same category. This would be
possible thanks to the codification of a general represen-
tation during the training phase. This representation
would allow children to ignore the categorically irrele-
vant differences between the stimuli of both phases.
For example, Welch (1939) conditioned two boys and
two girls between 18 and 20months of age by inducing
them to take an 8-inch square plywood side plate while
being told the word “ate”. During the generalisation tri-
als, children were taken to a room with four or five ob-
jects. One of these objects was a plate nearly identical to
the training plate, but with different dimensions (15.75 ×
0.15 inches). Subjects were then asked to take the “ate”.
When they failed, a new test was performed with a plate
whose dimensions were more similar to those of the
training plate. Each positive response (i.e., taking the
new plate) was interpreted as an indication of the exist-
ence of a categorical representation of “plate” resistant
to size modifications. Similarly, Ross et al. (1986) showed
that at 20 months children can extend arbitrary names
learned when seeing four groups of objects to new in-
stances of those groups. Other studies, meanwhile, found
generalisation answers regarding other object properties,
such as shape or colour (e.g., Hayne et al., 1987, at 3
months; Clifton et al., 1991, at 6 months; Collard &
Rydberg, 1972, at 8 months) or canonical orientation
(Freeman et al., 1980, at 9 months).
In another classic study, Fagen et al. (1976) trained 3-
month-old children by placing a five-component mobile
with animal figures over their cribs. They placed a rib-
bon connecting a baby’s ankle to the suspension bar
from which the mobile hung, so that babies could estab-
lish an association between their body movement and
the movement of the mobile (see Rovee & Fagen, 1976
for a detailed description of the methodology). When,
24 hours later, they switched from the original mobile to
other mobiles exhibiting zero to four differences (i.e.,
new components), they observed that subjects per-
formed kicks when one or two elements were changed,
but not when three or four were changed. This result
was interpreted as evidence in favour of the retention of
the stimulus-response interaction in the medium and
long term based on the codification of a categorical rep-
resentation, both in this study and in an extension of it
carried out with 3-month-olds (Greco et al., 1990).
A third form of category extension task can be found
in studies addressing children’s inductive generalisation
and its relationship to concept formation (Mandler,
2003; Mandler & McDonough, 1996, 1998; McDonough
& Mandler, 1998). We refer to studies where the train-
ing phase stimuli are different from those of the general-
isation phase. The variety of stimuli evaluates whether
children generalise properties from one conceptual do-
main to another and not only from one object to an-
other case of the same object (e.g., Baldwin et al., 1993).
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The standard procedure is simple: first, researchers re-
peatedly demonstrate to children an action with a mod-
elling exemplar and a prop, accompanying this
demonstration with linguistic information. This proced-
ure is called action modelling and involves the training
of a behavioural response. Then, two new modelling ex-
emplars are placed in front of the children at the same
time. One of them is a new exemplar of the same cat-
egory as the main training object. The other object acts
as a distractor (i.e., belongs to another category). Finally,
the prop with which the child has been trained is handed
over, and the linguistic information is provided again.
Researchers then evaluate whether children extend the
learned action to the object belonging to the same cat-
egory as the modelling exemplar or to the new distract-
ing object. Following this methodology, Mandler and
McDonough (1996) found that, at 14 months, children
who were shown the actions of “drinking from a glass”
and “lying on a bed” with a replica dog, while being told
“sip, sip, umm, good” and “night night”, respectively,
generalised these actions to other animals, but not to ve-
hicles. Conversely, after modelling with a replica car,
children generalised the properties of “owning a key”
and “taking a ride” to other vehicles, but not to animals.
In one replica (Mandler & McDonough, 1998), the au-
thors found the same results with 9-month-olds, sug-
gesting that, from that age, babies have global concepts
of animals and vehicles.
Other research employing these and other versions of
category extension tasks provided additional evidence of
the generalisation of body, sensory and movement prop-
erties with animals and people (Diesendruck &
Deblinger-Tangi, 2014 at 19 months; Poulin-Dubois
et al., 2006 at 14 months), functional properties with ob-
jects (Booth, 2006 at 18 months; Pauen & Bechtel-
Kuehne, 2016 at 18 months; Ware & Booth, 2010 at 19
months) and movement trajectories with abstract two-
dimensional stimuli (Johnson et al., 2003 at four
months).
Object sorting tasks
We have mentioned earlier that, for certain authors (Pia-
get, 1959/1991; Vygotsky, 1934/2008), true concepts are
developed in adolescence, when subjects come to fully
understand the logical and taxonomic relationship that
exists between a category and a subcategory as a conse-
quence of the development of formal operations or
higher psychological functions. The lack of this under-
standing would be responsible, from this perspective, for
the failures and limitations that children exhibit in clas-
sic object categorisation tasks.
In a pioneering work, Ricciuti (1965) proposed that
the “failure” of subjects in classical tasks (e.g., the inabil-
ity of children to verbally report why they had acted in a
certain way or the vagueness of the meaning of a word)
was not the product of an incomplete conceptual devel-
opment, but of the difficulty that the complicated lin-
guistic instructions of those tasks posed to them (see
also Ricciuti & Benjamin, 1957). This author also
emphasised the importance of considering the behav-
ioural responses that children give outside the semiotic
system of language. Specifically, he proposed that despite
not being able to follow verbal instructions, many chil-
dren do group objects systematically and spontaneously
and that this is a sufficiently valid indicator to study chil-
dren’s conceptual formation. This proposal thus links
object manipulation with alleged categorical and/or con-
ceptual behaviours, that is, organised behaviours of a
general type, based on cognitive rules (Nelson, 1973).
Following this hypothesis, different authors designed
more straightforward object sorting tasks to evaluate the
behaviours deployed by children during tasks. The
underlying premise of these tasks is that if children have
cognitively represented classes (i.e., concepts), they will
form groups of objects by separating in space those be-
longing to the same category from those belonging to
another.
Ricciuti (1965), for example, conducted an experimen-
tal study with 48 children aged 12, 18 and 24months
who were involved in four simple object sorting tasks. In
each task, he presented the children with a tray with
eight mixed objects (e.g., cubes, spheres and polygons),
four from one class and four from another. The classes
differed in colour, size and/or shape of the objects in-
volved. He then said to each child to “you play with
them—you fix them all up” (Ricciuti, 1965, p. 132), for
which he allocated a period of up to two and a half mi-
nutes. The results of the experiments showed that, from
the age of 12 months, some children manipulate objects
belonging to the same class in successive ways and form
spatially differentiated groups with objects belonging to
the same class. In other words, since the age of 12
months, some children seem to engage in categorical be-
haviours that could be considered preverbal instances of
conceptual formation.
These results have been endorsed by research with
both younger and older subjects. Starkey (1981) investi-
gated the ability of 6-, 9- and 12-month-old babies to
form groups with objects different in size, colour and/or
shape. His results showed that although 6-month-olds
are not able to group objects (probably due to a lack of
development in their motor skills), since the age of 9
months, babies exhibit certain rudimentary grouping be-
haviours that, at 12 months, show a higher degree of or-
ganisation. For its part, Nelson (1973) found that at 19
months of age children form groups of objects based on
differences in the dimensions of colour, shape and func-
tion of objects (i.e., any action associated with objects),
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both independently and in combination. These results
are consistent with the findings of Corrigan and Schom-
mer (1984), which show that at 24 months children pre-
sented with non-objects with different form but similar
function (and vice versa) in situations of social inter-
action with adults group objects according to both their
physical and functional attributes.
Sequential touching tasks
As mentioned, Ricciuti (1965) stressed the limited scope
of the classical tasks of object categorisation and pro-
posed to consider new indicators of early conceptual de-
velopment (i.e., the spatial grouping of objects).
Similarly, Sugarman (1981) argued that grouping tasks
are restricted and can be extended. According to her, a
complete analysis of categorical behaviour should not
only consider object grouping behaviours but also object
selection behaviours. In other words, children would not
only manifest conceptual consistency by spatially orga-
nising objects, but also by selecting them (i.e., touching
them) in a given order. This perspective gave rise to se-
quential touching tasks that, as the name implies, assess
the extent to which children sequentially touch objects
belonging to the same class. When this occurs to a
higher degree than could be expected by chance, the
subjects’ behaviour is explained positing the existence of
categorical representations (i.e., concepts).
In one study, Sugarman (1981) investigated 40 chil-
dren at 12, 18, 24 and 30months of age, presenting them
with seven sets of objects. Each set contained eight ob-
jects, of which four belonged to one category and four to
another, different in shape and/or colour. Due to the
lack of a tradition in studies using sequential touching
tasks, Sugarman suggested an innovative data analysis
that contemplated, on the one hand, the overall ordering
tendency. She included in this measure (i) the relation-
ship between two objects selected in succession in terms
of their belonging to a class (i.e., same/different cat-
egory) and (ii) the percentage of selected objects of each
class, for each set. In addition, she took into account the
presence of extended ordering sequences, a measure that
considered (i) concatenated selections of specific exem-
plars of the same class or of different classes (such as
doll1- > doll2- > doll1) and (ii) the number of sequences
involving three and four members of the same class. Her
results confirmed the existence of a statistically signifi-
cant tendency to touch, in sequential order, objects be-
longing to the same class at all ages and a progressive
increment, for each age, in the number and length of ex-
tended selection sequences.
Mandler et al. (1987) also used this procedure. Chil-
dren aged 14 and 20months were presented with three-
dimensional replicas of “animals” versus “cars” and
“bathroom objects” versus “kitchen objects”. After being
asked “What can you do with all these things?” they let
the subjects manipulate the objects for 2min, without giv-
ing them any feedback. The authors’ analysis considered
the mean lengths of the runs of successive touches from a
category and compared them to the expected chance run
length (see Mandler et al., 1987, p. 348). Although not sta-
tistically significant, the results showed children’s sensitiv-
ity to all categories at both ages. They also found that
while at 14months more children are simple categorisers
(i.e., they systematically touch objects of a single category),
at 20months the ratio between these and exhaustive cate-
gorisers (i.e., they systematically touch objects of both con-
trasted categories) is equal.
Thanks to sequential touching tasks, there is a large body
of evidence that concepts exist in early childhood. For ex-
ample, Mandler and Bauer (1988) reported that from 12
months boys and girls perform sequential touches based on
basic (e.g., dogs and cats), superordinate (e.g., animals and
vehicles) and contextual (e.g., kitchen objects, bathroom ob-
jects) categories (see also Poulin-Dubois et al., 2015). Man-
dler et al. (1991), in turn, argued that at 18months subjects
have the global categories of “animal”, “vehicle”, “plant”,
“furniture” and “kitchen utensil”, but show strong difficulties
in differentiating the basic-level categories contained in these
domains. This achievement would only become accessible
at 30months of age. The idea that global categories are the
first to be formed is also endorsed by Bornstein and
Arterberry (2010), who found that children between 12 and
30months of age first form more inclusive level categories
in the domains of animals, vehicles, fruits and furniture.
From another line of research, Rakison and Butter-
worth (1998a, 1998b, see also Rakison & Cohen,
1999) studied the categorisation of animals, insects,
vehicles and furniture in children aged 14 to 22
months by introducing a new sub-type of the proced-
ure, the confusion task. The novelty is that this task
modifies the structure of parts of objects that work as
stimuli (i.e., parts are removed, shifted or added) to
assess whether children categorise by looking at the
object as a whole (taxonomically) or specific parts of
the object (“partonomically”) (see Tversky & Hemen-
way, 1984). Evidence showed that children use infor-
mation about specific parts of objects to classify.
Thus, for instance, they formed two different categor-
ies when exposed to animals with legs and to vehicles
with wheels, but not when all replicas had the same
parts (i.e., legs or wheels) or did not have common
salient parts (i.e., did not have legs or wheels). Also,
authors found that these findings hold up when intro-
ducing replicas with parts in unusual orientations, but
not when parts violate the usual global configuration
of objects, suggesting that from 14 months subjects
treat objects as totalities and, at the same time, as
collections of parts.
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Finally, other works demonstrated that 14-month-old
children can flexibly categorise a collection of objects ac-
cording to their shape or the characteristics of their ma-
terial (Ellis & Oakes, 2006). In addition, at this age,
children can differentiate between brushes and tele-
phones—but not pears and lemons—both with artefacts
and three-dimensional replicas (Arterberry & Bornstein,
2012) and have already developed the animate/inanimate
conceptual distinction (Rostad et al., 2012).
Object examination tasks
The last group of studies corresponds to object examin-
ation tasks. The origin of this procedure can be traced
back to the contributions of Ruff (1986), who demon-
strated that the time children between 7 and 12months
spend examining an object (i.e., looking at it closely or
inspecting it manually) is inversely proportional to the
degree of familiarity they have with the object, some-
thing that also happens with gaze in habituation studies.
Based on this, the author proposed that object examin-
ation reflects attentional cognitive processes and the in-
corporation of environmental information. Relying on
Ruff’s contributions, Oakes et al. (1991) proposed to
study early conceptual formation combining the logic of
the habituation paradigm with object examination as a
dependent variable. They claimed that this methodology
allows for solving some problems of the other ap-
proaches. For example, before the age of 12 months, per-
formance in sequential touching tasks could be
subsidiary to children’s motor skills and not to their
conceptual development. Besides, in sequential touching
tasks, subjects are not required to respond to all stimuli
(i.e., they may ignore some of them). Object examination
tasks, on the other hand, pose minimal motor demands
(since looking in focus is considered a form of examin-
ation) and require a response of the subject to each ob-
ject. Also, object examination tasks are more ecologically
valid than traditional habituation experiments because
they involve a higher level of activity on the part of the
subject.
In a familiarisation phase, children are habituated to
objects of the same category (e.g., “vehicles”) which are
repeatedly placed within their reach in different trials.
Subsequently, in the test phase, researchers present a
new object of the category that is allegedly known and a
new object belonging to another category, one at a time.
After comparing the examination times for each of the
test stimuli, “if infants increase examining of novel toys
from a novel category, but not to novel toys from the fa-
miliar category, then it is clear that they have responded
in terms of category membership” (Oakes et al., 1991,
pp. 380–381).
Following this procedure, Bornstein and Mash (2010)
showed that at 5 months children can distinguish between
two categories of non-objects that are different in colour
and shape, both with pre-task training (i.e., seeing at home
images of stimuli 2 months before the test) and without
any training. For their part, Oakes et al. (1991) verified the
existence of a conceptual distinction between trucks and
animals from 6months of age, congruent with the results
of Mandler and McDonough (1993), who reported that
from 7months of age there are conceptual categorisation
processes in the domains of animals and vehicles. In
addition, they showed evidence that, by 9months, subjects
distinguish, at the basic level, between cars, motorcycles
and aeroplanes (see also Pauen, 2002a). Pauen (2002b),
meanwhile, showed that 10-month-olds categorically dis-
tinguish replicas of animals and furniture, even when
there are inter-categorical perceptual similarities (see also
Kovack-Lesh & Oakes, 2007 for a study on the categorisa-
tion of horses versus dogs). This suggests that there may
be other sources of information to form categories, such
as object functions (see Träuble & Pauen, 2007).
Evidence from studies with children aged 1 to 2 years is
consonant with the results of studies with younger sub-
jects. On the one hand, it confirms categorical sensitivity
to non-objects with different functions (e.g., Madole et al.,
1993; see also Casler & Kelemen, 2007) or physical charac-
teristics (e.g., Welder & Graham, 2006). On the other
hand, it shows that this sensitivity is favoured if nouns or
adjectives are proffered when presenting objects (Nazzi &
Gopnik, 2001; Waxman & Markow, 1995).
Other procedures
Ten studies could not be classified into any of the sets de-
scribed above. As they do not show unity at the proced-
ural level, we chose instead to mention some of them
briefly in this section. For one thing, we have included
here two neuropsychological studies that measured the
brain activity of infants between 4 and 8months when
they were shown random images of exemplars from the
“animate/inanimate” (Jeschonek et al., 2010) or “human/
animal” (Marinović et al., 2014) global domains. The stud-
ies showed that from 4months, there are differences in
neural responses to stimuli, which the authors interpreted
as evidence of categorical brain processing.
There are also descriptive studies carried out in
ecological contexts without variable control. These
studies, based on observation, meticulously describe
conceptual behaviours. Connolly and Dalgleish (1989),
for instance, reported the longitudinal evolution of
the ability to use a spoon by its function during the
second year of life. They identified changes taking
place in dimensions such as gripping strategies, visual
monitoring and contralateral hand activities. The au-
thors’ interpretation is that between 12 and 24
months, children develop a general (i.e., conceptual)
ability to use spoons according to their canonical
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function effectively. Another study with implications
for understanding the development of numerical skills
is that of Scheuer and Sinclair (2009). They reported
that, from 21 months, a girl began to use the same
linguistic-numeric symbol (e.g., “one”) to designate
identical and dissimilar exemplars of the same
category (e.g., “one, one, one” to refer to three tiles
or three identical T-shirts; “one, one” to refer to two
different replica elephants). However, the girl did not
extend this symbol to exemplars from other categor-
ies that were present at the time of categorising.
Finally, Mervis (1985) noticed that, at 9 months, her
son already knew how to blow in a canonical fashion
a horn with which he interacted daily. She decided to
explore whether or not this behaviour was general by
providing the child with other household objects to
play with. The results showed that the child also used
his knowledge of the canonical use of the horn when
interacting with a plastic bucket and an ice cream
cone, thus suggesting the cognitive reality of a prever-
bal categorical representation.
Discussion: methodological limitations
All tasks and procedures have provided valuable data
to broaden our understanding of early conceptual de-
velopment. However, there are methodological limita-
tions that are worth briefly describing, both to
consider the consequences of study conclusions with
some caution and to suggest possible future avenues
of research in the area.
It is striking that almost all studies on conceptual
development are cross-sectional or cross-sequential
(96.8%), with few studies being longitudinal (3.2%)
(see Fig. 3). It is not that these studies are not useful.
However, there are aspects of cognitive development
that can only be understood through longitudinal
designs (Hoppe-Graff, 1989; Müller & Giesbrecht,
2008), such as the characteristics of intra-individual
change and its causes, or the patterns of development
associated with individual differences (Nesselroade &
Baltes, 1979). While it is true that “effective longitu-
dinal research on individual development must deal
with substantive, far-reaching methodological and
research strategy problems” and that “few areas of
research are so full of traps as development research”
(Magnusson, 1989, p. vii), it is also true that obtain-
ing repeated intra-individual measures brings unparal-
leled security to cognitive development research
(Grimm et al., 2017).
Similarly, most of the studies involve experiments
(97.1%) and adopt a quantitative approach to data
analysis (98.6%). Relegating qualitative information to
the background is more than a research strategy: in
the epistemological level, it assumes that phenomena
Fig. 3 Subjects’ age range for each study
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can be explained by translating them into the lan-
guage of numbers and applying to them a statistical
treatment (Tuli, 2011). Also, the fact that most stud-
ies have been conducted in laboratory settings has
some unintended consequences for research (Lécuyer
& Rovira, 1999). One of them is that experimental
control significantly reduces the degree of external
validity of the designs. The critical point is that re-
searchers can provide very accurate information about
what happened in the laboratory after the manipula-
tion of each independent variable, but they cannot
guarantee that what they say applies to the real world
(which is supposed to be the explanandum that
makes research reasonable).
There are several examples of asymmetries be-
tween what happens in the laboratory and what hap-
pens in the everyday world. The first of them relates
to the referents of children's categorical representa-
tions: what do children categorise in everyday life?
Studies have used a variety of stimuli, ranging from
abstract patterns of movement or images to replicas
and non-objects specially constructed for experi-
ments. These are mostly abstract and artificial stim-
uli (Sakharov, 1990) whose structure is not
analogous to real-world stimuli (Anderson & Prawat,
1983). Rakison and Butterworth (1998b), for in-
stance, recognise (though do not share) that it is
possible to think that “a ‘cow with wheels’ is simply
no longer a cow” (p. 58). This dissociation between
the laboratory and the real world is often a deliber-
ate investigative strategy to achieve greater control
of variables or to isolate the effect of a particular
variable (e.g., the influence of form vs. function of
objects on categorisation, or differences in categor-
isation of objects with more or less obvious percep-
tual properties; Corrigan & Schommer, 1984; Perone
& Oakes, 2006; Strauss, 1979; Welder & Graham,
2006). However, the cost of achieving a higher de-
gree of internal validity is, in this case, to bypass the
objects to which children have access in everyday life
(e.g., instruments and artefacts used during meal-
time). This, in turn, reduces the degree of external
validity of the designs and entails a first degree of
denaturalisation of the object of study.
Another limitation concerns the sample size of the
studies. One of the advantages usually attributed to la-
boratory tasks is that, as they are shorter and more con-
trolled than other studies (e.g., descriptive longitudinal),
they can involve larger samples. This is relevant because,
according to the Central Limit Theorem (Kwak & Kim,
2017), if random samples of n observations are chosen
from a population with mean μ and standard deviation
σ, the larger n is, the closer the sample distribution of
means will be to a normal distribution with mean μ and
standard deviation σ=
ffiffiffi
n
p
. Thus, a large n (greater than
or equal to 30) (Salkind, 2012) allows the use of more
accurate and reliable parametric statistics than non-
parametric ones and, therefore, the generalisation of the
results to the population of reference. However, in the
studies we reviewed, total sample sizes only exceed 30
subjects in 50.17% of the studies (M = 32.56, SD = 21.52)
and the number of subjects in the subsamples per experi-
mental condition is only higher than or equal to 30 in
3.2% of the cases (M = 14.13, SD = 6.34) (see Fig. 4). This
is not a minor issue. As others have noted, the use of small
samples is a severe problem, as it undermines the statis-
tical power of experimental explanatory studies by making
the results neither meaningful nor reproducible, especially
in the case of psychological and neuroscientific literature
(e.g., Bakker et al., 2012; Button et al., 2013; Marszalek
et al., 2011). In this way, it does not seem plausible to jus-
tify the realisation of experimental studies alluding to the
advantages they could provide for the generalisation of the
results2.
Consideration should also be given to the relationship
between the stimuli and the categories whose formation
is to be assessed. The question is whether a differential
response to drawings and images (26.6% of the studies)
or replicas (23.5%) points to the existence of the concept
of the objects these stimuli represent. Although some
argue that it does (McDonough & Mandler, 1998, p.
231), there is also evidence that this would not be the
case (Arterberry & Bornstein, 2012; Arterberry et al.,
2013; DeLoache, 2000; Flavell et al., 1990). The difficulty
lies in the symbolic character of images and replicas:
“before one can understand or use any symbol, one must
first realise that it is a symbol, that is, that it stands for
or represents something other than itself” (DeLoache,
1991, p. 736). This would seem to suggest that for the
formation of the first concepts it is necessary to have
first developed symbolic skills and dual representations,
which is anti-intuitive and incongruent with much of the
academic literature on the subject (for a review of sym-
bolic development see Rodríguez et al., 2014).
2Indubitably, whether they are cross-sectional or have small samples is
not a problem for exploratory studies that do not intend to lead to
conclusive or generalisable results. However, it becomes a problem as
soon as studies employ experimental designs that seek to measure the
effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable and in which
data analysis makes use of parametric tests (e.g., ANOVA). This is be-
cause parametric tests, as hypothesis testing procedures, are based on
assumptions about the distribution of the underlying population distri-
bution (e.g., the data are approximately normally distributed). Since in
parametric tests a sample statistic is obtained to estimate a population
parameter and the vast majority of studies that we reviewed make use
of this type of tests, it is clear that they are intended to be explanatory
rather than exploratory. We would like to thank an anonymous re-
viewer for emphasising this point.
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Third, we should not forget that categorisation takes
place within the framework of organised everyday activ-
ities and not in a vacuum (e.g., Nelson, 1985; Mandler
et al., 1987). These everyday activities are not equivalent
to experimental tasks. In preference and habituation ex-
periments, for example, the test trials are successive and
extraordinarily brief and, once completed, stimuli dis-
appear. This contrasts with the time children spend
interacting with objects in everyday life and with the
stimuli availability of the real world (Corrigan & Schom-
mer, 1984).
On the other hand, there is evidence that children under
24months have severe difficulties in retaining the concep-
tual categories learned during experimental tasks for more
than a few minutes (Merriman et al., 1997; Rose et al.,
2001; Sherman, 1985; see also Oakes & Kovack-Lesh,
2013). This sudden amnesia (Hayne et al., 1987) contrasts
with what happens in adult cognition, where categories
amplify action possibilities (Tulving, 1983). In addition,
these oblivions do not satisfy the temporal stability re-
quirement that Schlesinger (1982) proposed to distinguish
children conceptual behaviours. In this way, the pragmatic
usefulness of the concepts reported in experiments is
questionable: Why would children have developed such
volatile conceptual representations? From a functional
perspective, Nelson (1989) has argued that memory is a
by-product of everyday life and that “remembering the
past has value insofar as it serves action in the present or
future. Thus what is remembered should be that that en-
ables the individual to carry out activities, to predict and
to plan” (Nelson, 1989, p. 144).
This suggests that an ecological study of categorisation
should consider the challenges, interests and goals that
children face in their everyday contexts. At the same time,
one must consider the great variety of tasks and stimuli
used in studies, perhaps inherited from the lack of clear
criteria on what it means to speak of categorisation or
early conceptual formation (Oakes et al., 1991). This pro-
cedural breadth adds up to the great variety of concepts
being investigated (e.g., belonging to different domains)
and their multiple levels of complexity (e.g., basic, super-
ordinate, global). Overall, these factors make results highly
entropic and make it impossible to reach an agreement as
to when categorical representation abilities would develop
(see Figs. 5 and 6). It should be noted that the disparate-
ness of concepts under research is due, at least in part, to
differences between the theories that underlie empirical
undertakings and between the hypotheses that these the-
ories seek to validate. Thus, some of the theoretical de-
bates concern, for instance, whether in early development
(i) concepts are prototypical representations (e.g., Rosch,
1998) or represent sets of exemplars (e.g., Hayne et al.,
Fig. 4 Sample/subsample sizes. Densities and means for each distribution
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1987), (ii) whether concepts are based on perceptual (e.g.,
Fagan, 1976; Welder & Graham, 2006) or functional ob-
ject attributes (e.g., Booth et al., 2010; Nelson, 1973), (iii)
whether basic-level (e.g., Mervis & Crisafi, 1982) or
global-level categories (e.g., Mandler & McDonough,
1993; Rostad et al., 2012; Quinn, 2004) are developed first,
(iv) whether the structure of concepts resembles that of a
complex scientific theory (e.g., Gopnik, 1984) or is formed
by everyday particular encounter with objects (e.g., Toma-
sello, 1999), (v) whether conceptual knowledge is orga-
nised in partonomies rather than taxonomies (e.g.,
Tversky & Hemenway, 1984) and (vi) whether language is
essential to concept formation (e.g., Ferry et al., 2010; Xu,
1998)3.
This links to the debate on the value of empirical indi-
cators considered in each methodological perspective.
Visual preference methods, for example, exhibit two
problems. On the one hand, it is not clear that an in-
crease in gaze fixation times reflects categorical know-
ledge. It could be, instead, the result of basic attentional
processes not accessible to consciousness (Bonatti et al.,
2002). On the other hand, in these experiments, the sub-
ject is a passive spectator only allowed to respond
through his gaze. In addition to being uncomfortable for
children (Ruff, 1978), this procedure also contradicts
everyday experience, where action is of paramount im-
portance (Babska, 1965). Those who have researched
through object examination tasks emphasise, precisely,
the advantage that this task supposes in allowing the
child to interact with objects (e.g., Mandler et al., 1987,
p. 352). However, in these tasks, action is restricted, due
to the control measures that the laboratory experimenta-
tion requires.
Another ubiquitous bias among studies is that they con-
sider categorisation as an individual achievement. Children
would form categories through direct contact with the stim-
uli proposed by the researchers. Adult influence is dis-
missed, because it is assumed that adults’ cognitive
capacities have already been “obscured by layers of acquired
knowledge and idiosyncratic processing strategies” (Quinn
et al., 1993), by the cultural niches in which they live. How-
ever, there are two reasons to doubt the individualistic
stance. First, from the beginning of life, children are part of
early triadic interactions in which adults act as ambassadors
for the material world. If children manage to construct a
Fig. 5 Method vs age of development of categorical representations (months). Density and means for each distribution
3Due to the methodological nature of this review, we do not explore
here the practical consequences of different theoretical frameworks
(for a theoretical analysis, see Alessandroni, 2020; Alessandroni &
Rodriguez, in press).
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conceptual system like that of adults, this is not due to
chance, but to a large number of semiotic communicative
mediators that adults incorporate in interactive situations to
share meanings (Alessandroni et al., 2019; Moreno-Núñez
et al., 2017; see also Luce & Callanan 2010 on parents' object
labeling). Second, if concepts are powerful cognitive tools
for communication, it is unlikely that subjects will develop
autonomous conceptual systems, as this would make inter-
personal understanding impossible. Rather, what should be
explained is how the intersubjective cognitive agreements
that constitute the common ground of categorisation and
communication through concepts are constructed (see
Rodríguez, 2015; Waxman et al., 2016).
Finally, most studies assume that concepts are percep-
tual distillates. Categories would result from comparing
and abstracting physical properties of objects (e.g.,
Bomba & Siqueland 1983; Casasola & Ahn 2018; Quinn
& Johnson 2000; Ruba et al., 2017; Stavans & Baillargeon
2018; Younger & Fearing 1999, 2000). However, this
prospect raises hard problems at the epistemological
level (for an in-depth discussion, see Alessandroni, 2020;
Alessandroni & Rodríguez, in press). There may be other
bases for conceptual formation, such as object function
(Barsalou et al., 2018; Nelson, 1973, 1983; Oakes, 2008).
Although some studies assume this functional perspec-
tive, there is no agreement on the definition of
“function”. Sometimes, “function” refers to everything
we can do with objects, that is, to the set of action possi-
bilities that objects enable. This definition correlates to
the concept of affordance proposed by Gibson (1979/
2015). In opposition, the perspective of the pragmatics
of the object (Rodríguez et al., 2018; Rodríguez & Moro,
1999) has proven that among this set of possible actions
some are culturally privileged and are primarily commu-
nicated in interactive situations: the canonical functions
of objects. These are not the actions that can, but those
that must, be carried out with objects in a given socio-
cultural and historical context (e.g., cups should be used
for drinking). This type of knowledge is indispensable
for children, as it provides them with a criterion of pub-
lic objectivity. Thanks to it, children become cultural
agents who align their actions and objectives with social
norms. In any case, the distinction between these two
levels of analysis (Borghi, 2005) seems crucial for the
study of categorisation. Possessing the concept of fork
involves not only information about forks’ physical char-
acteristics and everything that could be done with them,
but also information about how one should act with
forks in our cultural environments. The lack of canon-
ical knowledge would lead children to a state of perman-
ent uncertainty about others’ actions and a state of
paralysis concerning their own action.
Fig. 6 Stimuli vs age of development of categorical representations (months). Density and means for each distribution
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Conclusions
In recent years, a good deal of evidence has accumulated
on the early development of categorisation skills and
conceptual thinking. The results suggest that from 2
months of age, children can form categorical representa-
tions in a wide variety of domains and levels of abstrac-
tion. The experiments of preference and habituation,
clearly dominant in the research scene, as well as the
other tasks and procedures, have challenged the trad-
itional conception of the baby as a subject trapped in the
dimension of the singular. From the first months of life,
long before the development of articulated language,
children can think in general terms.
However, the studies exhibit a number of methodo-
logical limitations relating to (i) the temporality of re-
search designs, (ii) the stimuli validity, (iii) the sample
and subsample sizes; (iv) the data analysis approach, (v)
the mismatch between the nature of tasks and children's
real-world experience, (vi) the empirical indicators that
are considered as sufficient to speak of categorical repre-
sentation and (vii) some epistemological and theoretical
assumptions about the bases of categorisation.
Wishing to unravel the way children conceptualise the
real world by investigating their behaviour in artificial
worlds is, clearly, of no investigative relevance (Kemler
Nelson, 1990, p. 606). In that sense, our review points to
the urgency of proposing new paradigms for the study of
conceptual development. First, there is a strong need to
investigate the dynamics of conceptual development as it
takes place in everyday life, in the context of structured
activities, considering not only the perceptual properties
of stimuli but also their functional aspects. In this regard,
we briefly highlighted the practical importance of know-
ledge about the canonical function of objects: it allows us
to orientate in the world and to plan our action. There is
general agreement that these two are preconditions for
talking about concepts. Besides, knowledge of canonical
object functions provides a way to explain the communi-
cative power that categorical representations acquire once
they have been formed, appealing to cultural processes of
meaning and rule construction. If, as Nelson (1973, 1983)
and Mervis (1985) argue, this type of knowledge is funda-
mental for the formation of the intensional core of object
concepts in early childhood, it would be worthwhile to in-
vestigate it with greater precision. To achieve this goal, it
would be desirable to carry out longitudinal studies in
ecological contexts such as children’s home and Early
Childhood Education settings (Gruber et al., 2015;
Murphy, 2002). Perhaps, these are the two most critical
everyday contexts for babies, as this is where they tend to
spend the most time. Finally, we believe that to advance
research in this area, we should consider larger units of
analysis that reflect the intersubjective networks through
which children categorise the world. For all these reasons,
a non-reductive model of children’s conceptual develop-
ment requires a serious investigation of the structural and
dynamic characteristics of the communicative and semi-
otic mediation processes that adults bring into play during
the processes of children's conceptual formation, as well
as their relationships with the pragmatic and sociocultural
complexity of the material world.
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